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CROSS-BORDER CONSTRAINTS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND 
INTEGRATION OF THE DUTCH - GERMAN GAS MARKET 
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Abstract 
We estimate the contribution of institutional changes in the Dutch and German gas markets to 
the integration of these markets. We measure this contribution through the impact of 
bottlenecks in the cross-border infrastructure on cross-border price differences. In the period 
2007-2011, the differences in both price levels and price volatility between these two markets 
decreased. We find evidence that institutional changes in the Dutch market, in particular the 
abolishment of the obligation to book quality-conversion capacity, have reduced the impact 
of cross-border infrastructure bottlenecks on regional price differences. The integration of 
German regional networks into larger systems, however, appear to have had a negative effect 
on the integration with the Dutch market. 
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Since the liberalisation of European gas markets in the 1990s market places in various 
European countries have been developed, such as the National Balancing Point (NBP) in the 
United Kingdom, the Title Transfer Facility (TTF) in the Netherlands and 
NetConnectGermany (NCG) in Germany. The liquidity of in particular NBP and TTF has 
grown significantly over the past years (Heather, 2012). For the creation of a European gas 
market, the national market places need to be mutually connected, enabling traders to engage 
in international price arbitrage. The level of the installed transport capacity, however, 
frequently formed a constraint for international trade (Neumann, Rosellón and Weigt, 2011). 
In addition, access to the transport infrastructure was limited as long-term access rights were 
granted to the existing firms on the basis of non-market mechanisms as FCFS and pro-rata1, 
resulting in an inefficient use of cross-border capacity (EC, 2007; NMa, 2007; LECG, 2011).  
We estimate the impact of cross-border infrastructure barriers on cross-border price 
differences and we analyse to which extent this impact changed under the influence of 
institutional changes affecting the liquidity of separate market places. Our paper is related to 
papers like Siliverstovs, L’Hégaret, Neumann and von Hirschhausen (2005), Cuddington and 
Wang (2006), Marmer, Shapiro and MacAvoy (2007) and Growitsch, Stronzik and Nepal 
(2012) who also analyse the integration of regional gas markets. The contribution of our 
paper is that we not only use data on prices, but also data on the utilisation of infrastructure. 
Unlike earlier literature, we make a distinction between low calorific gas (L-gas) and high 
calorific gas (H-gas) for which there are different supply grids in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Northern France and Northern Germany. H-gas is mainly used by industrial consumers. 
Furthermore, we assess the contribution of institutional changes in national market places to 
the integration of markets, comparable to the analysis of Kleit (1998) who analyses the effect 
                                                          
1
 FCFS stands for “first come first served”; ‘pro rata’ is an allocation on the basis of relative demand. 
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of deregulation on integration of US gas markets.  Finally, we not only look at cross-border 
price differences but also at cross-border differences between within-day price ranges. 
We focus on the Dutch market, as here a large domestic supply and demand coincides 
with a high degree of connection with its neighbouring countries (Germany, Belgium and 
United Kingdom), while a number of institutional changes occurred in the recent past.2 In the 
period 2007-2011, three major changes in the Dutch gas market occurred affecting the 
liquidity of the TTF (Heather, 2012). In 2009, the obligation of market parties to book 
quality-conversion capacity was abolished, actually removing the distinction between H-gas 
and L-gas in gas trade. In April 2011, two other changes were implemented: the introduction 
of a market-based balancing regime and the new policy of GasTerra, the Dutch incumbent 
gas trader, to supply all gas for the domestic market on the TTF instead of factory gates or 
city gates.    
We further focus on the connection with Germany as most of the Dutch imports and 
exports pass this border.3 Although Germany has two major gas market areas (NetConnect 
Germany (NCG)) and GASPOOL Balancing Services (GPL), we analyse in particular the 
connection with NCG as this hub was more a trading hub than GPL which was until recently 
primarily used for balancing purposes (Heather, 2012). Moreover, in the NCG market a 
number of merging activities took place during the period of analysis. Note that Growitsch et 
al. (2012) found that the NCG and GPL markets were reasonably well economically 
integrated, although capacity constraints hindered perfect arbitrage from time to time. 
                                                          
2
 Within countries also barriers might exist, but these do hardly play a role in the Dutch market. 
3
 The highest export flow of L-gas to Germany in 2011 was approximately 40 GW, which was about twice as 
big as the highest export flow to Belgium. For H-gas the respective amounts are 30 (Germany) and 15 
(Belgium) GW, while the export of H-gas to the United Kingdom peaked at 15 GW in 2011. For the import of 
H-gas, the Dutch-German is even more important: the highest hourly import in 2011 was about 30 GW, while 
through the Dutch-Belgian border no more than 5 GW was imported. 
4 
 
Our analysis is directed at the influence of the above institutional changes on the 
integration of the TTF and the NCG market. All these changes were supposed to make the 
gas markets more liquid. As an increase in liquidity enlarges the flexibility of a market to 
respond to exogenous shocks, we expect that these measures also have reduced the impact of 
cross-border constraints on price differences between the Dutch and German market. 
We apply GARCH (1,1) models to the differences in daily gas prices on the TTF and 
NCG over the period June 2007 – December 2011. We use a mean equation in which the key 
explanatory variables are the daily utilization rates of the L- and H-gas export infrastructure 
and dummies for the institutional changes with interaction terms. We control for the influence 
of time patterns, outside temperature and  the Ukraine gas crisis. 
We analyse market integration in two ways. The difference in the highest daily day-
ahead prices between TTF and NCG is our measure of integration of price levels.4 In 
addition, we look at the range between the highest and the lowest day-ahead prices at TTF 
and NCG. The high-low price range of day-ahead prices is interpreted as an indicator of 
volatility. In an integrated market, not only price levels converge, but also price volatility as 
in integrated markets all prices show similar movements (Stigler and Sherwin, 1985) 
reducing the difference between the high-low ranges of day-ahead prices at TTF and NCG. 
We use day-ahead prices because daily changes in cross-border utilisation in particular affect 
short term prices. 
The utilisation rates are used as a measure of the cross-border constraints, using daily 
data on transport flows and capacity (GTS, 2012). We measure the constraint as a continuous 
variable because traders can be expected to face more difficulties in acquiring additional 
capacity if the level of transport flows approaches the capacity levels. This general 
                                                          
4
 The price data are obtained from Bloomberg. These data are to a large extent similar to the data from ICIS 
Heren, although some small differences exists. 
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relationship holds even more in the gas industry where most of the capacity is booked in 
advance through long-term contracts, leading to situations in which some traders face 
capacity restrictions where others still have unused capacity (CEER, 2011). This means that 
utilisation rates (far) below 100% may indicate constraints for international price arbitrage. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives the theoretical background, Section 3 
describes the Dutch gas market and its connection with the German market. This section also 
introduces various institutional changes in the Dutch and German gas market. Section 4 
presents the empirical model, Section 5 gives the results of the econometric analysis and 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Infrastructure constraints and gas prices  
We measure the integration of gas markets by the evolvement of price differences. 
This analysis is based on the idea that in a fully integrated market, price differences quickly 
disappear as a result of traders using arbitrage opportunities (Stigler and Sherwin, 1985). In 
such a market, price differences between countries do not exceed the actual costs of 
transportation, including transaction costs. If, however, constraints between regional markets 
do exist, prices in these markets are not directly related to each other anymore and, as a 
result, they may show diverging patterns for a period of time (Marmer et al., 2007). Hence, in 
case of transaction costs as well as cross-border constraints, the Law of one Price (LOOP) 
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where the p0 and p1 are the prices in the markets 0 and 1, respectively, t1,0 is the transaction 
costs of exporting the good from market 1 to market 0, q1,0 is the actual flow of the good from 
market 1 to market 0 and Q1,0 is the cross-border transport capacity from market 1 to market 
0. As far as the constraint is not reached by the actual flows, the price difference equals the 
transaction costs. 
The impact of infrastructure constraints on prices fundamentally differs from the 
impact of costs of transportation. The latter is related to actual costs, while a barrier is not 
directly related to costs but to the impossibility to realise arbitrage benefits. Furthermore, 
costs of transportation reflect cross-border price differences if transportation is allocated 
through an auction mechanism. Even in such cases, transport costs need not be fully equal to 
cross-border differences if cross-border trade is hampered  by imperfect information, as is 
shown for European electricity markets by Gebhardt and Höffler (2013). In the gas market, 
however, the prices for cross-border capacity are subject to regulatory supervision resulting 
in constant costs on annual basis. Note, that transaction costs might also include other 
transaction costs, for instance costs related to finance and insurance (Barrett, 2001). 
We are interested in the impact on prices of constraints in the cross-border flows 
resulting from a high level of utilisation of the infrastructure. If p1
 
– p0 > t1,0 and if the 
infrastructure to import from country 1 to country 0 is fully utilised, this price difference 
cannot be reduced through arbitrage. Note that the causality between regional price 
differences and utilisation of infrastructure is bidirectional: the more benefits can be realised 
(i.e. the larger the regional price differences), the sooner a connecting infrastructure is fully 
utilised.  If differences in prices between regions increase, for instance due to a supply shock 
in one region, the utilisation of the infrastructure increases as a result of traders searching for 
arbitrage profits. This should be  taken into account in the econometric analysis. 
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We elaborate on previous papers analysing the degree of integration of gas markets on 
the basis of price differences between countries or hubs. Several authors have found evidence 
for economic integration of markets. Siliverstovs et al. (2005) find, on the basis of a 
cointegration analysis on data from the early 1990s to 2004, that the European and Japanese 
gas markets were integrated in the long term, because of the presence of similar long-term 
contract structures and oil-price indexation. Although cointegrated, short-term price 
differences did exist as a result of fluctuations in transportation costs as well as the use of 
different types of reference oils applied in the oil-price indexation contracts. Regarding the 
relationship between the European markets and the US gas markets, the authors find that 
these markets were not integrated as arbitrage was hardly possible between these regions, 
while there were neither common drivers behind the gas prices. In the US, gas prices were 
already more determined in competitive gas markets, while in Europe gas prices were more 
linked to the oil price. Marmer et al. (2007), however, argue that the US gas market consists 
of three relatively isolated regional markets: the Northeast, Midwest and California. Demand 
shocks in one of these regional markets appeared not to result in sufficient price adjustments 
in other regions. Cuddington and Wang (2006) also find different regional markets within the 
US. 
For the German gas market, Growitsch et al. (2012), using a cointegration and a time-
varying coefficient approach, find that the two major trading hubs (NCG and GPL) and the 
Dutch TTF market are reasonably well integrated. Nevertheless price differences do occur 
which cannot be explained by transportation costs, i.e. the exit and entry charges imposed in 
the entry-exit system of the gas networks. The authors conclude that capacity constraints 
between the two German markets still hinder the realisation of perfect arbitrage. In addition, 
they conclude that the German NCG market and the Dutch TTF are increasingly integrated: 
prices between NCG and TTF appear to adjust within one trading day.  
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Our analysis differs from the above studies as we focus on how institutional changes 
affects the impact of cross-border constraints on price differences. If an institutional change 
raises the liquidity of a gas market, it indirectly reduces the sensitivity of prices in that market 
to constraints in a specific part of the infrastructure. Neumann and Siliverstovs (2005), for 
instance, find differences in prices between unconstrained markets which might be due to 
illiquidity of one of those markets. Hence, in liquid markets, traders are better able to quickly 
respond to changes in market circumstances (Cuddington and Wang, 2006; LECG, 2011). 
 
3. The Dutch gas market and its cross-border connections 
A characteristic phenomenon of the Dutch market is the presence of a huge swing field 
(Groningen), i.e. a field with a high well-head pressure enabling the operator to quickly 
change the level of production, and a number of small fields, both onshore and offshore. 
Because of the Groningen field, the Dutch gas industry is able to export gas with a high 
seasonal profile to the neighbouring countries. The Dutch gas network is connected to the 
networks in Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom. The connection with German is 
used both for import (mainly H-gas) and export (mainly L-gas), while the other two 
connections are only used for export. The UK-NL interconnector is bi-directional since 
October 2010. This is one of the institutional changes we discuss at the end of this section. 
The net flows to Germany, defined as Dutch import minus Dutch export, as well as the 
exports to Belgium and the United Kingdom have a strong seasonal pattern (Figure 1). 
During winter time, exports exceed imports, while during summer time imports exceed 
exports, which is related to the abovementioned swing characteristic of the Groningen field. 




Figure 1. Net flows between the Dutch market and the markets in Germany, the United 














Import of gas consists only of H-gas from the Gasunie Deutschland (GUD) network, which is 
a part of GASPOOL. This gas, coming from Norway and Russia, is partly used by industrial 
consumers, including electricity companies, while the other part is re-exported. The latter 
implies that the Dutch network is also used as a transit network, needed to bring gas from for 
instance Russia to the United Kingdom. These transit flows are less temperature related than 
the domestic demand by residential users. The data show that import flows are fairly flat 
during a year.  
As explained in Section 1, we focus on the NCG network. The capacity to export to 
the NCG network stayed fairly stable, both for H-gas and for L-gas (Figures 2 and 3). This 
capacity was almost permanently fully booked on a long-term basis. One reason for the high 
level of contracting is that firms need to be able to adapt supply to changes in demand levels, 
which is particularly relevant for exporters supplying flexibility services (GTS, 2012).  
Hence, they book capacity on a firm basis which means that are assured the capacity will be 
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available. If not 100% certainty is needed, shippers can also book interruptible capacity 
which is capacity facing the risk of not being available in case of a high level of utilisation.  
The tariffs for booking transport capacity are subject to regulatory supervision: on 
annual basis, the tariffs should be such that the aggregated revenues (given a certain expected 
level of volume) do not exceed the level of so-called efficient costs of the TSO including a 
fair return on capital (NMa, 2011). The Dutch TSO sets tariffs for all entry and exit points, 
both on the borders and domestically. In 2011, there were specific tariffs for 19 entry border 
points and 25 exit border points. For each point, different tariffs exist for different periods for 
which capacity is needed. The reference tariff is the tariff for one year. The (unweighted) 
average annual tariff for all cross-border exit points were 1.55 Euro/MWh/h/year in 2007 and 
2008, 1.62 Euro/MWh/h/year in 2009, 1.68 Euro/MWh/h/year in 2010 and 2011. These 
tariffs were constant during a year. 
 
Figure 2. Utilisation of the Dutch export infrastructure for H-gas to the NCG network 

























The liquidity of the TTF has grown substantially. The share of the TTF in the Dutch 
gas market increased from 5% in 2007 to 40% in 2011 (Figure 4). Although the churn ratio 
between nominated volumes and volumes actually delivered on the TTF remained fairly 
stable at the level of about 4, the actual churn ratio exceeded 15 as an increasing number of 
trades occurs in the period before traders have to nominate their gas flows.5 A churn ratio 
above 10 indicates that the TTF is a mature market (GTS, 2012; Heather, 2012). The churn of 
the NCG, however, hardly exceeded 1, implying that the trade in this market is relatively 
strongly related to physical delivery and that this market is much less liquid than TTF and 
NBP. 
                                                          
5
 Traders have to nominate their gas flows within a year before the gas is going to flow. During this year the gas 
can still be exchanged, resulting in new (re)nominations. When the gas is actually going to flow, the last 
nomination of a gas flow is translated into an allocation of a gas flow, which is related to the actual delivery. 
The churn ratio presented in Figure 4 is based on the aggregate nominations versus the aggregate allocations. 
12 
 








The day-ahead price on the TTF during the period 2007-2011 is depicted in Figure 5. 
Besides the volatility from day to day, we also see significant changes from year to year. The 
day-ahead price on the NCG correlates strongly with the day-ahead price on the TTF 
(correlation coefficient is 0.993). From Figure 6, we see that the difference between the 
highest and lowest day-ahead price on the TTF fluctuates strongly, resulting in large spikes 
from time to time. The correlation between highest and lowest day-ahead prices on the TTF 
and NCG has increased from 0.430 in the first half of the sample (before October 2009) to 
0.687 since October 2009. 
The price difference between TTF and NCG does not reveal a seasonal pattern, but it 
has clearly declined over the past years (Figure 7). In 2007, substantial differences in prices 
existed, but gradually these differences have become smaller. This holds both for the 
differences between the highest daily prices on TTF on the one hand and NCG on the other 
(Figure 7) and for the differences in the volatility, measured by the range between the highest 
daily price and the lowest daily price (Figure 8).   
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Figure 6. Range between highest and lowest day-ahead gas price in the Dutch market 




Figure 7. Difference in the day-ahead gas price in the Dutch market (TTF) and the 











Figure 8. Difference in the range between the highest and the lowest day-ahead gas 









Figure 9. Utilisation of infrastructure for the export of L-gas to Germany (NCG) and 









Figure 10. Utilisation of infrastructure for the export of H-gas to Germany (NCG) and 











The cross-border infrastructure is increasingly efficiently used: in 2011 less hours 
showed price differences while the infrastructure was not fully used compared to a number of 
years ago (Figures 9 and 10). In these  hours, traders apparently face restrictions in using the 
infrastructure to benefit from arbitrage opportunities. Nevertheless, in 2011 price differences 
still frequently occurred which might be caused by remaining bottlenecks in using the 
infrastructure. 
 
Table 1. Institutional changes in the Dutch and German gas market, 2007-2011 
Dummy 
variable 
Date of implementation Dutch market German market 
D1 1 October 2007  Introduction of entry-exit system 
between 19 zones in Germany 
   
D2 1 July 2008 The Dutch TSO (Gasunie) acquires 
 the GUD network in Germany 
    
D3 1 October 2008  NetConnect Germany (NCG) results 
from pooling of areas of E.ON and 
Bayernets 
    
D4 1 July 2009 Abolishment of the 
obligation to book quality-
conversion capacity 
 
    
D5 1 October 2009  NCG network is extended with GRTgaz 
Deutschland, ENI and GVS 
    
D6 1 October 2010 Introduction of backhaul on 
BBL 
 
    
D7 1 April 2011 New balancing regime; 
Obligation to deliver gas on 
the TTF 
NCG network is extended with 
Thyssengas 
The dummy variable takes the value of one from the start of the institutional change. The institutional changes 
remain in affect also after a new measure has been implemented. This implies that, for instance, the value of D4 
is zero before July 1, 2009 and one on July 1, 2009 until the end of the sample. In October 1, 2010 another 
policy is implemented. So D5 becomes one on October 1, 2009 until the end of the sample, while D4 remains 
one.  
 
In this paper, we analyse the impact of a  number of institutional changes in both the 
Dutch and the German market (Table 1). In the models discussed in the next section, these 
institutional changes are modelled using dummy variables defined in Table 1. 
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A key institutional change in the Dutch market was the abolishment of the obligation 
of market parties to book quality-conversion capacity as of July 1, 2009. The connection with 
the UK market was raised through the introduction of interruptible reverse (backhaul) flow 
services on the BBL (Balgzand-Bacton Line), making it possible to book gas in the reverse 
direction (GTS, 2012).  
Other measures to improve the liquidity of the Dutch wholesale market were the 
implementation of a market-based balancing regime on April 1, 2011 and the policy of 
GasTerrra, the Dutch incumbent gas supplier, to deliver all gas for the domestic market on 
TTF instead of factory or city gates (Heather, 2012). 
In the German market also several institutional changes occurred. After the 
introduction of an entry-exit system in October 2007, several networks pooled resulting in 
two network areas for H-gas and only one for L-gas. The two German H-gas networks are 
NCG and GPL; the former covers the southern part of Germany and the latter the northern 
part. 
 
4. Empirical model and data 
4.1 Dependent variables 
 We measure the economic integration of the Dutch and German gas market through 
differences in the day-ahead prices. We use the day-ahead price instead of longer-forward 
prices as the former prices are more sensitive to short-term changes in availability of cross-
border capacity. As day-ahead prices refer to gas flows on the next business day, we relocate 
the prices in the database accordingly, taking into account the effect of weekends and bank 
holidays.  
Data on the prices were obtained from the Bloomberg database. This database gives 
the highest price realised on a day, the lowest prices and the last price. We use this data to 
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estimate two different models. In the first model the dependent variable is the difference in 
highest daily day-ahead price on the Dutch market (TTF) and on the German market (NCG). 
In the second model the dependent variable is the difference in the daily price range (i.e. the 
highest daily price minus the lowest daily price) between both markets. The daily price range 
can be seen as measure for the daily volatility. For both models we use the same set of 
explanatory variables. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of differences in maximum daily gas price (TTF minus  

















Mean  0.081 -0.490 -0.633  0.135 -0.131 -0.101 -0.159
Median  0.100 -0.450 -0.450  0.050 -0.100 -0.100 -0.150
Std. Dev.  0.681  0.839  1.202  0.228  0.415  0.226  0.448
Skewness  1.376 -0.738  2.087  1.090 -0.813  0.966  5.564
Kurtosis  13.167  6.793  20.556  4.102  6.538  5.881  57.032
nObs.  186  62  185  65  249  125  188
Data source: Bloomberg  
 
Table 3. Summary statistics of differences in daily price range (TTF minus NCG), for  
















Mean  0.778  0.669  0.501  0.193  0.236  0.191  0.091
Median  0.625  0.475  0.250  0.150  0.200  0.100  0.050
Std. Dev.  0.637  0.936  1.207  0.252  0.485  0.373  0.472
Skewness  2.004  2.324  3.519  0.656 -1.026  2.834  2.950
Kurtosis  10.064  8.891  21.937  5.624  18.009  16.786  27.709
Obs.  186  62  185  65  249  125  188




Tables 2 and 3 report descriptive statistics for various subsamples that reflect 
important institutional changes reported in Table 1. Table 2 shows that, on average, NCG 
prices exceed TTF prices. The biggest difference of -0.633 euro/MWh is reported in the 
period October 1, 2008 – June 30, 2009 before the obligation of market parties to book 
quality-conversion capacity was abolished in the Netherlands. Over time the price difference 
steadily decreases to -0.159 euro/MWh after April 1, 2011. A similar pattern is observed for 
the median price difference. The standard deviation reaches its lowest value in the period 
between Oct 1, 2010 and Mar 31, 2011. The gas price difference shows a long right tail 
(positive skewness) especially towards the end of the sample, and the distribution of the price 
difference is peaked relative to the normal distribution (kurtosis coefficient > 3) for all 
periods. The average difference in the range of the daily gas prices between the Dutch and the 
German market steadily decreases from 0.778 euro/MWh before July 1, 2008 to 0.091 
euro/MWh after April 1, 2011 as Table 3 indicates. The distribution of the difference in the 
daily range is positively skewed and is relatively peaked in most of the sample. 
Autocorrelations of the maximum price differences suggest dependence in the mean, 
and the autocorrelations of the squared price differences reveal dependence in volatility (see 
Appendix B). The former observation leads us to assume an AR(1) process in the mean 
equation, while the latter observation justifies the use of GARCH models.6 Table B2 in 
Appendix B indicates that there is also dependence in the mean and volatility for the 
difference in the price range (measured as the difference between the high and low gas prices 
within a day) between the Dutch gas market and the German gas market. 
 
                                                          
6
 See Appendix A for the specification of GARCH models. 
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4.2 Base model 
The base model consists of a set of explanatory variables measuring the utilisation of 
infrastructure and controlling for a number of other influences on price differences.  
The infrastructure constraint is included by the (first lag of the) maximum daily 
capacity utilisation (U), defined as the ratio (in %) between the total daily allocated capacity 





BNINFNU −+=         (2) 
where t is the suffix for days.7 The total available capacity is based on firm capacity (FC), 
which is the capacity allocated to market parties under firm conditions (GTS, 2012). Total 
allocated capacity consists of both firm (FN) and interruptible (IN) nominations.8 For 
unidirectional clusters9, we net the interruptible forward with the backhaul nominations (BN). 
After all, backhaul results in lower net flows. For bidirectional clusters, this is not needed as 
here no backhaul takes place. Since we want to analyse the relationship between gas prices on 
network level, we measure the utilisation of the cross-border infrastructure on network level 
as well, aggregating the cluster-level data. In addition, we take the maximum daily value of 
the utilisation rates as these better reflect cross-border constraints than for instance the 
                                                          
7
 Gas prices are only available on working days, as exchanges and OTC trading places are closed on weekends 
and bank holidays. Therefore, we estimate the infrastructure utilisation also per day. Since we want to know 
whether an infrastructure is congested, we use the maximum hourly value per day 
8
 These data are measured at the level of clusters, which might combine several entry and/or exit points. Note 
that the maximum capacity of a cluster might be lower than the aggregate capacity of the related entry/exit 
points.  
9
 The Dutch gas network is connected to the neighbouring networks through a number of entry and exit points. 
These points are grouped together in about 10 clusters. As the network is distinguished in a L-gas and a H-gas 
part, there are also separate clusters for L-gas and H-gas and also for Groningen-gas or G-gas and G+-gas. See 
GTS (2012) for more details. 
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average daily value. Moreover, as separate infrastructures exist for H- and L-gas, we include 
the utilisation rates for both export of H-gas (UEX-H) and export of L-gas (UEX-L).10 
 Tables 4 and 5 show the summary statistics of these two variables for various samples 
which are related to the institutional changes (see Table 1). It appears that the (maximum 
daily) utilisation rate is fairly constant over the various samples, both in terms of average 
value (mean and median) and in terms of volatility (standard deviation). Moreover, the time 
series are hardly skew distributed and they neither show a peak relative to the normal 
distribution (kurtosis < 3). Only the last period (April 2011 – December 2011) shows a 
somewhat deviating pattern. 
 Table 4. Summary statistics of the utilisation rate of the H-gas export infrastructure to
















Mean  0.650  0.624  0.627  0.617  0.617  0.631  0.586
Median  0.623  0.597  0.597  0.596  0.598  0.587  0.565
Std. Dev.  0.196  0.186  0.187  0.184  0.188  0.178  0.138
Skewness  0.011  0.112  0.132  0.083  0.068  0.373  0.465
Kurtosis  1.797  1.918  1.876  1.933  1.914  1.833  2.524
nObs.  1060  874  812  627  562  313  188
 
We take the first lag of the utilisation rate while the price data were placed one day into the 
future (see Section 4.1). Consequently, we control for the fact that traders may know the 
utilisation rate when they make their trade decisions on the day-ahead market, while we do 
not encounter causality problems as the utilisation rate on a specific day cannot be influenced 
by trade decisions on that same day (which result in flows the next day). 
                                                          
10
 There is no import of gas from NCG. 
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Table 5. Summary statistics of the utilisation rate of the L-gas export infrastructure to
















Mean  0.413  0.393  0.406  0.385  0.407  0.418  0.308
Median  0.396  0.356  0.380  0.336  0.390  0.450  0.214
Std. Dev.  0.203  0.203  0.202  0.191  0.189  0.202  0.175
Skewness  0.215  0.384  0.309  0.380  0.220  0.0004  0.969
Kurtosis  1.656  1.811  1.756  1.692  1.624  1.487  2.533
Obs.  1060  874  812  627  562  313  188
  
We also include the net cross-border flow of gas (L-gas + H-gas in GW) to and from 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Belgium as exogenous variables (NX). The latter 
variables are included to control for the effects of trade in gas between all Dutch trading 
partners on the price of gas in the Netherlands. We expect that these flows negatively 
influence price differences. These variables are lagged one period to avoid possible biases 
due to reverse causation.11  
We also control for the Ukraine gas crisis in January 2009, which strongly affected 
European gas markets, by including a dummy (D_UKR) for the period 7 January 2009 – 18 
January 2009 (Kovacevic, 2009). Moreover, we control for the impact of cold weather 
periods on the gas market by including the Heating Degree Days (HDD), based on the 
average daily temperature in the Netherlands as measured by the Dutch Meteorological 
Institute (KNMI). In addition we include dummies for months (Mi) to capture seasonal 
patterns. We also include year dummies (Yi) to control for annual changes in cross-border 
tariffs. 
                                                          
11
 Including contemporaneous explanatory variables using IV yields similar results. However finding valid and 




What we have described above is the base model for price differences (in euro/MWh) 
and differences in the daily range of gas prices (Pttf-ncg , in euro/MWh) between TTF and NCG 



















where vector Zt captures all other control variables. The coefficients of interest are β0 and χ0. 
These coefficients measure the impact of a one unit increase in the maximum daily capacity 
utilisation for exports of H-gas and L-gas respectively, on the difference in the daily prices.  
 
4.3 Alternative models 
With the alternative models, we analyse the impact of a  number of institutional changes in 
both the Dutch and the German market (Table 1). We capture the effect of each of these 
institutional changes by dummy variables. These variables are included in the model both 
separately and in interaction with the variables measuring the degree of utilisation of the 
cross-border infrastructure. As the different sample periods are characterised by comparable 
levels of utilisation of the cross-border infrastructure (Tables 4 and 5), we may conclude that 
possible differences in estimation results for the various interaction terms cannot be the result 
of different levels of the utilisation rates, but must be the consequences of external factors, 
such as changing liquidity of the gas markets. 

























































































  (4) 
Because of the way the dummies are coded (one from the implementation date of the policy 
until the end of the sample), the coefficients for the interaction terms measure the impact of 
the change in the degree of capacity utilisation on the cross-border price difference of that 
policy. Again, for the second model we replace the maximum price difference with the 
difference in the price range, denoted as Sttf-ncg.  
The hypotheses are that the institutional changes led to reduced differences in both the 
highest daily prices and the price range (i.e. highest minus lowest price) between the Dutch 
gas market and the German gas market. These hypotheses can be tested from parameters 
β1,…,β7 and χ1,...,χ7. 
 
5. Results 
In this section we report the estimation results for Equations (3) and (4). In these equations, 
the coefficients for the maximum daily utilisation rates for exports of H-gas and L-gas are 
independent of their initial levels. Including power terms to allow for nonlinearities did not 
lead to different results, so we estimate the original equations. But before we estimate 
Equations (3) and (4) we show that the variables in these equations are stationary, so that the 
results reported here are not spurious. In the previous section we indicated that these 
equations cannot be estimated efficiently with Least Squares. Here, we test formally that we 
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need to apply GARCH models (see Appendix A) in which Equations (3) and (4) are the mean 
equations. 
5.1 Testing 
Tests for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test of the maximum prices (both 
TTF and NCG) do not reject the null of a unit root at the 5% significance level. This is 
confirmed by the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test. The latter test does not reject the 
null of stationarity at the 5% significance. However, both test clearly indicate that the cross-
border difference in maximum prices clearly is stationary. The same holds true for the 
difference between the within-day price range. Hence, the dependent variables in Equations 
(3) and (4) are stationary. Also the explanatory variables are stationary. 
Applying the ARCH LM-test on ordinary least squares estimates shows that the null 
of no serial correlation of volatility is strongly rejected for lags up to order 10 and higher (at 
5% significance levels), whereas the null in the price range model is rejected for 8 lags and 
higher. Testing reveals that the models are not covariance stationary, so we estimate 
Integrated GARCH(1,1) models implying that the volatility of the model is not mean-
reverting as is often observe in financial time series. As a consequence external shocks 
leading to a change in volatility are permanent.12 
 We assume that the residuals do not follow a normal (Gaussian) distribution, because 
the error distribution is fat-tailed (a higher than normal probability of extreme events) as is 
often observed in finance and commodity markets. Applying the likelihood-ratio test to test 
the null of normally distributed errors against both the generalized error distribution and the t-
distribution clearly rejects the null (χ2(1) exceeds 558 in all four models). With t-distributed 
                                                          
12
 Caporale, Pittis and Spagnolo (2003) and Mikosch and Stǎricǎ (2004) examine why volatility may not be 
mean reverting. They refer to nonstationarities and structural breaks. 
26 
 
errors the log likelihood (ln L) for all models is higher than assuming that the errors follow a 
generalized error distribution.13 So, we estimate the models assuming that the errors are t-
distributed.14 The degrees of freedom (dof) for the t-distribution is about 3.3 for the price 
difference model and even lower for the price range model. These estimates which are shown 
in the tables in the next section suggest that the error distribution is fat tailed.15  
 The ARCH LM test indicates that there is no autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity up to any order in the standardized residuals for the base models and the 
alternative models including policy dummies. This is confirmed by the Ljung–Box Q–
statistic of the standardized squared residuals up to any lag. From these tests we conclude that 
the volatility model is adequate.  
Concluding, we apply GARCH (1,1) models to the differences in daily gas prices in 
the Netherlands (TTF) and Germany (NCG) over the period June 2007 – December 2011. We 
use a mean equation (3) that includes a constant, month and year dummies, lagged net gas 
flows, lagged maximum daily utilization rates for exports of L-gas and H-gas, dummies for 
the institutional changes with interaction terms, the Ukraine dummy, heating degree days 
(HDD),  and an AR(1)–term as is suggested by the autocorrelations in Appendix B. 
 
5.2 Estimation results 
From Table 6, showing the results for the base models, we conclude that the degree of 
utilization of the cross-border infrastructure is positively related to cross-border differences in 
price levels. This result confirms our expectation that the utilization rate affects the ability of 
                                                          
13
 Obviously this is confirmed by Akaike’s Information Criterium (AIC = 2k – 2 ln L, where k is the number of 
parameters which is the same for the generalized error distribution and the t-distribution). 
14
 The estimates in case the errors follow a  generalized distribution are in Appendix C. 
15
 The t-distribution approaches the normal if the degrees of freedom gets infinitely large. 
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traders to make use of arbitrage opportunities. This positive relationship is found for both the 
H-gas and the L-gas network. Regarding differences in volatility (measured as the within-day 
price range), we find a positive relationship for the utilization of the H-network, but not for 
the L-network. 
The differences in price levels appear to be negatively related to the size of cross-
border flows between the Netherlands and Germany, which was also expected. The net cross-
border flows between the Netherlands and the markets in Belgium and the UK had no effect 
on the price differences with Germany as we may expect. The outside temperature, measured 
by the Heating Degree Days, negatively affects price differences, which means that when the 
gas demand is relatively large due to low temperatures, markets have more difficulties to 
realize equal prices. From Table 6 we also learn that seasonal effects play a significant role 
explaining cross-border price differences, both regarding levels and volatility (price range). 
The Ukraine gas crisis had a positive  effect on differences in price volatility, which likely 
resulted from the high level of uncertainty in European gas markets in those days. 
The focus in this paper is on the effects of the various institutional changes. The 
effects of these changes are based on interpreting the coefficients of the interaction terms of 
the dummies and the export capacity utilization variables for H-gas and L-gas (Table 7). The 
dummy variables are related to the utilization of both the H-gas and the L-gas network. 
Because the utilization variables for H-gas and L-gas are strongly correlated we need to test 
the joint significance of the corresponding coefficients for H-gas and L-gas in order to assess 




Table 6. Results for the base models with t-distributed errors, 2007-2011 (Obs = 1133) 
 Difference in price levels Difference in price range 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Mean equation 
constant -0.162  0.124  0.614*** 0.138 
U EX-H  0.373*** 0.076  0.141* 0.080 
U EX-L  0.146 0.136 -0.314* 0.169 
NX GER -0.001*** 0.0001  0.000002 0.0001 
NX UK -0.00004 0.0001  0.0002 0.0002 
NX BEL  0.00005 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
D_UKR -0.627 0.439  1.228*** 0.268 
HDD  0.007*** 0.003  0.002 0.004 
Month1 -0.118** 0.057 -0.011 0.067 
Month2 -0.139*** 0.040 -0.137** 0.055 
Month3 -0.153*** 0.045 -0.180*** 0.055 
Month4 -0.209*** 0.057 -0.174** 0.068 
Month5 -0.230*** 0.075 -0.221** 0.086 
Month6 -0.167** 0.074 -0.238*** 0.088 
Month7 -0.150** 0.075 -0.250*** 0.088 
Month8 -0.058 0.077 -0.233** 0.091 
Month9 -0.130* 0.074 -0.162* 0.090 
Month10 -0.211*** 0.070 -0.048 0.078 
Month11 -0.072 0.049 -0.121* 0.064 
Year2  0.061 0.058  0.067 0.049 
Year3  0.042 0.050 -0.225*** 0.043 
Year4  0.121** 0.054 -0.288*** 0.051 
Year5 -0.042 0.052 -0.367*** 0.048 
AR(1) -0.329*** 0.022  0.115*** 0.022 
Variance equation 
1α , ARCH(1)  0.130*** 0.010  0.062*** 0.006 
1λ , GARCH(1)  0.870*** 0.010  0.938*** 0.006 
t-dist dof  3.341*** 0.166  2.862*** 0.095 
Log likelihood -509.872  -679.675  
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7. Results for the alternative models with t-distributed errors, 2007-2011 (Obs = 
1133). Results for M, Y and UKR dummies, HDD and net flows available on request 
 Difference in price levels Difference in price range 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Mean equation 
constant   0.170 0.454  1.300*** 0.478 
D1 -0.924* 0.488 -0.471** 0.501 
D2  1.482* 0.830  1.779 0.849 
D3 -1.516* 0.888 -1.278 0.949 
D4  0.652** 0.267 -0.175 0.360 
D5 -0.619*** 0.215  0.082 0.258 
D6  0.493*** 0.178  0.301 0.250 
D7 -0.471*** 0.179 -0.605* 0.347 
U EX-H  0.795 0.546  0.359 0.555 
D1 * U EX-H -0.089 0.622  0.545 0.647 
D2 * U EX-H -1.584 1.000 -2.934*** 0.957 
D3 * U EX-H   2.107** 1.071  1.653 1.090 
D4 * U EX-H -1.188** 0.515  0.482 0.650 
D5 * U EX-H  0.435** 0.220  0.161 0.255 
D6 * U EX-H -0.610*** 0.233 -0.614 0.411 
D7 * U EX-H  0.250 0.223  0.400 0.422 
U EX-L -0.119 0.895  0.061 0.767 
D1 * U EX-L  0.727 0.975  0.686 0.907 
D2 * U EX-L -0.017 1.261 -1.758 1.283 
D3 * U EX-L -0.678 1.253  1.349 1.348 
D4 * U EX-L -0.669 0.568 -1.694** 0.800 
D5 * U EX-L  0.826* 0.492  0.961 0.601 
D6 * U EX-L  0.601* 0.312  0.409 0.506 
D7 * U EX-L -0.935*** 0.343 -0.503 0.554 
AR(1)  0.135*** 0.023  0.057*** 0.022 
Variance equation 
1α , ARCH(1)  0.119*** 0.010  0.058*** 0.006 
1λ , GARCH(1)  0.881*** 0.010  0.942*** 0.006 
t-dist dof  3.017*** 0.118 2.766*** 0.084 
Log likelihood -412.144  -631.151  
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 8. Joint significance (a) and significance of the sum (b) of the coefficients of 









(a) H0: C(1)=0,C(2)=0  
H1: C(1)≠0 and/or C(2)≠0 
F-Statistic (p-value) 
(b) H0: C(1)+C(2)=0  
H1: C(1)+C(2) ≠0 
F-Statistic (p-value) 
Differences in price level 
D1 -0.089  0.727 0.383 (0.682) 0.227 (0.634) 
D2 -1.584 -0.017 1.901 (0.149) 0.628 (0.428) 
D3  2.107 -0.678 3.666 (0.026) 0.494 (0.482) 
D4 -1.188 -0.669 3.143 (0.044) 5.403 (0.020) 
D5  0.435  0.826 3.110 (0.045) 5.160 (0.023) 
D6 -0.610  0.601 5.160 (0.006) 0.001 (0.980) 
D7  0.250 -0.935 4.493 (0.011) 2.704 (0.100) 
Differences in price range 
D1  0.545  0.686 0.564 (0.569) 1.080 (0.299) 
D2 -2.934 -1.758 4.718 (0.009) 5.836 (0.016) 
D3  1.653  1.349 1.244 (0.289) 2.168 (0.141) 
D4  0.482 -1.694 2.601 (0.075) 1.323 (0.250) 
D5  0.161  0.961 1.467 (0.231) 2.932 (0.087) 
D6 -0.614  0.409 1.348 (0.263) 0.110 (0.740) 
D7  0.400 -0.503 0.791 (0.454) 0.024 (0.877) 
  
 
Table 8 shows two tests based on the coefficients of the dummies interacted with the 
maximum daily utilization rates for exports of L-gas and H-gas. Test a) tests the null that 
both coefficients are zero against the alternative that at least one coefficient deviates from 
zero. From Table 8 we conclude that the dummies D3-D7 have a significant influence on the 
differences in price levels, while dummies D2 and D4 have an impact on differences in 
volatility (within-day price range). In particular the abolition of the obligation to book 
quality-conversion capacity in 2009 (D4) has reduced cross-border differences in both price 
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levels and price volatility. The measures implemented on the 1st of April in 2011 (D7) also 
had a positive effect on market integration between the Dutch and the German market. The 
pooling of network areas in Germany into larger networks in 2008 and 2009 (D3 and D5), 
however, seem to have reduced the integration with the Dutch market. We do not find an 
effect of the introduction of an exit-entry system in Germany in 2007 (D1) and the acquisition 
of the GUD network by the Dutch Gasunie (D2). Regarding the implementation of backhaul 
on BBL (D6) we do find a significant effect on differences in price levels, but the sign of this 
effect is not clear as the coefficients for the L-gas network and the H-gas network are of an 
equal size but with the opposite sign. This is confirmed in Test b) where the  hypothesis is 
tested that the sum of coefficients deviates from zero. The abolition of the obligation to book 
quality-conversion capacity in 2009 (D4) and the pooling of network areas in 2009 Germany 
(D5) indicate a significant impact on differences in the price level, whereas the acquisition of 
the GUD network by the Dutch Gasunie (D2) and D5 show a significant impact on the 
difference in price volatility. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Comparing the daily gas prices between the Dutch market (TTF) and the German market 
(NCG), we find that these markets have become more integrated over the past years. At the 
end of 2011, the difference in price levels is -0.159 euro/MWh which is lower than it was in 
the period from mid-2008 to mid-2009. Comparing the difference in the price range (high-
low prices), we observe a steady drop from 0.778 euro/MWh to 0.091 euro/MWh in 2011.  
Using daily data on cross-border infrastructure utilisation and prices, we find that the 
degree of utilization of the cross-border infrastructure is positively related to price 
differences, but that this relationship weakens during the period of analysis. We find  
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evidence that the several institutional changes within the Dutch market have contributed to 
this. The abolishment of the obligation to book quality-conversion capacity on 1 July 2009 as 
well as the introduction of a market-based balancing regime and the policy of the Dutch 
incumbent GasTerra to deliver all gas on the TTF as from 1 April 2011 have contributed to 
making the Dutch market less sensitive to cross-border constraints. Hence, these measures 
appear to have raised the ability of market players to respond more quickly to price 
differences between the Dutch and German market. The pooling on network areas in 
Germany in 2008 and 2009, however, seems to have reduced the integration with the Dutch 
market. This result might be related to the fact that the NCG market is still not a very liquid 
market, while the TTF market has become one of the most liquid gas markets in Europe. 
We stress the fact that our analysis of the effects of the regulatory interventions on 
market integration is done by capturing these measures through dummy variables, implying 
that the results might be distorted because of the influence of other events occurring at the 
same time. Further research is needed to analyse to which extent such events really have 
taken place. In addition, extending our analysis by also paying attention to the utilisation of 
the cross-border infrastructure with the GUD network in Germany and the networks in 
Belgium and the UK could further enhance the understanding of the impact of the 
institutional changes on the integration of gas markets. 
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APPENDIX A: Specification of ARCH models 
ARCH models have been developed to correct for clustered volatility (see Engle, 1982; 
Bollerslev, Engle and Nelson, 1994, generalized to GARCH by Bollerslev, 1986). Neglecting 
the exact nature of the dependence of the variance of the error term conditional on past 
volatility results in loss of statistical efficiency.  
 Defining 2ε t  as the variance of the error term tε  in a generalized regression equation 
where the dependent variable ty is determined by a set of regressors tx , 
 ttt xy εβ+′= ,                          (A.1) 
GARCH models assume that the conditional variance 2σt  (the variance of tε conditional on 
information up to time t-1 changes over time) is affected by conditional variances q periods 



















++= ,                                        (A.2) 
where .0≥λ,0≥α,0α0 ji>  This model is referred to as a GARCH(p,q). Note that with p=0 
the model is an ARCH(q) model. To test whether volatility is serially correlated over time up 
to some lag p, first estimate the mean equation (A.1), retrieve the residuals tε , and regress the 
squared residuals on lagged squared residuals up to lag p (this procedure is known as the 
ARCH LM test). If the usual assumption that standard errors εt are Gaussian is violated, 
quasi–maximum likelihood covariances and standard errors as described by Bollerslev and 




 Well–defined conditional variances require that the parameters ,α,α0 i  and jλ  are non–
negative. The estimate ∑∑ λˆαˆ ji +  is a measure of persistence: the average time for 
volatility to return to the mean is ( )∑∑ λˆαˆ1/1 ji +− . If the estimate for ∑∑ λˆαˆ ji + is close 
to unity, the model is not covariance stationary (the process is an Integrated GARCH 




APPENDIX B Test on autocorrelations in dependent variables 
Table B1. Autocorrelations of the differences and squared differences in maximum 
daily gas prices (TTF - NCG), sample period: June 2007 – December 2011  
Lags Price differences  Squared price differences 
1 0.385* 0.165* 
2 0.347* 0.117* 
3 0.243* 0.078* 
4 0.187* 0.038 
5 0.179* 0.036 
6 0.165* 0.033 
7 0.165* 0.033 
8 0.184* 0.026 
9 0.223* 0.044 
10 0.214* 0.044 
* Significantly different from zero at approximately the 5% significance 
level if the autocorrelations exceed 2/√N (=0.059 with N=1135). 
 
 
Table B2. Autocorrelations of the differences and squared differences in the price range 
(TTF - NCG), sample period: June 2007 – December 2011  
Lags Price differences  Squared price differences 
1 0.224* 0.066* 
2 0.184* 0.050 
3 0.116* 0.009 
4 0.152* 0.028 
5 0.181* 0.025 
6 0.109* 0.030 
7 0.183* 0.067* 
8 0.218* 0.262* 
9 0.189* 0.045 
10 0.095* 0.000 
* Significantly different from zero at approximately the 5% significance 
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